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FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL† 
Although campaign reformers may believe otherwise, it is not only 
the money in campaigns that is problematic.  Campaign speech can 
also threaten the integrity of the electoral process.  It can be mislead-
ing, manipulative, offensive, defamatory, and, in the case of judicial 
campaigns, unethical.  It can distort the issues, distract the voters from 
making informed decisions, inhibit voter turnout, and alienate the 
citizenry.  Its effects on the political system can be as corrosive as the 
worst campaign finance abuses. 
Currently, a number of legal sanctions are available, at least in 
theory, to redress excesses in campaign speech.  These sanctions in-
clude individual defamation and privacy actions for damages and state 
unfair campaign practice restrictions that directly penalize the dis-
semination of false and misleading campaign speech.  In addition, 
there are other types of extant or proposed campaign regulations, 
such as those requiring certain types of disclosure for so-called nega-
tive ads, or those requiring the candidate herself to appear on her 
campaign’s paid advertising, aimed at improving the content of cam-
paign speech.  As with campaign finance regulations, however, restric-
tions on campaign speech raise difficult constitutional issues. 
Thus far, the Supreme Court’s approach to campaign speech 
regulation has been erratic at best.  Some cases suggest that First 
Amendment review in this area should be especially stringent.  As the 
Court has stated, the First Amendment has its “fullest and most urgent 
application [in] campaigns for political office.”1  Other cases, how-
ever, suggest precisely the opposite, i.e., that the role of the First 
Amendment is less complete in its application to campaign speech re-
strictions than it is in other areas.2  Accordingly, the Court has at times 
 
 † Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.  I am grateful to all the 
participants in this Symposium and to the participants of the faculty workshop at Bos-
ton University for their helpful remarks and comments.  Special thanks go to Rick Ha-
sen and Sam Issacharoff for their valuable insights.  Finally, I would like to thank Seth 
Turner and Marc Wilson for their research assistance. 
1 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
2 As Heather Gerken wrote in reference to the restriction on write-in protest votes 
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upheld restrictions on campaign speech where comparable prohibi-
tions on noncampaign speech would have been struck down.3 
This inconsistency, while certainly not laudable, is at least under-
standable.  The concerns on both sides of the campaign speech re-
striction debate are particularly powerful.  On one side, unchecked 
excesses in campaign speech can threaten the legitimacy and credibil-
ity of the political system.  On the other, regulating campaign speech 
is problematic because of the serious dangers and risks in allowing the 
government and the courts to interfere with the rough and tumble of 
political campaigns.  Courts and commentators are therefore to be 
excused if they cannot find easily discernible solutions to this conflict. 
Undeterred, this paper nevertheless examines the constitutional 
issues surrounding campaign speech regulation.  The inquiry is 
timely.  McConnell v. FEC,4 the Court’s most recent foray into the con-
stitutionality of campaign finance regulation, should have a significant 
impact on issues pertaining to the regulation of campaign speech.5  At 
the same time, the debate over campaign speech restrictions may also 
have implications for McConnell.  One of the more intriguing aspects 
of the McConnell decision is the extent to which it relies on rationales 
equally applicable to campaign speech regulation as to campaign fi-
 
upheld in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), “it is difficult to imagine that an ac-
tivity with such obviously expressive dimensions would have been so easily dismissed 
under traditional First Amendment doctrine.”  Heather K. Gerken, Election Law Excep-
tionalism?  A Bird’s Eye View of the Symposium, 82 B.U. L. REV. 737, 739-40 (2002). 
3 Gerken, supra note 2, at 739-40 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court 
treated election law differently in a First Amendment analysis).  Compare Police Dep’t 
of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (striking down an ordinance that allowed only 
labor picketing near a school on the grounds that such a subject-matter distinction was 
impermissible under the First Amendment), with Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 
(1992) (upholding a restriction on the distribution of campaign literature near a poll-
ing place despite the claim that singling out campaign literature for unfavorable 
treatment constituted an impermissible subject matter distinction). 
4 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
5 Indeed, section 311 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) is, in effect, 
a campaign speech regulation in that it requires each candidate to “stand by her ad” by 
confirming that she has approved the ad’s message.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, sec. 311, § 318, 116 Stat. 81, 105-06 (2002) (codified at 2 
U.S.C. § 441d (2004)).  The Court in McConnell upheld section 311 without serious 
discussion.  124 S. Ct. at 710.  Of similar effect is BCRA section 305, because it denies a 
candidate the benefit of reduced advertising rates unless the candidate certifies that 
the ad does not refer to another candidate for the same office or, if it does so, that it 
clearly indicates that the candidate approves of the ad.  See id. sec. 305, § 315(b), 116 
Stat. at 100-02 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2004)) (requiring that broadcasters sell 
a candidate advertising time at the “lowest unit charge”).  Although the constitutional-
ity of section 305 was challenged in McConnell, the Court did not reach the issues be-
cause of justiciability concerns.  124 S. Ct. at 707-08. 
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nance restrictions.  Analyzing the issues surrounding the regulation of 
campaign speech may then be as useful in assessing the wisdom of 
McConnell as it is in evaluating the merits of the campaign speech issue 
itself. 
In order to provide focus, this Article will concentrate on a par-
ticular type of campaign speech regulation, specifically restrictions 
that sanction the dissemination of false campaign speech.  Generally, 
deliberately false statements have been held not to raise First 
Amendment concerns,6 while the dissemination of false statements 
has been considered to be exceptionally damaging to the integrity of 
the electoral system.7  The regulation of deliberately false campaign 
statements thus presents the case for the regulation of campaign 
speech in particularly stark form. 
Part I of this Article introduces the subject by discussing a recent 
case in which a candidate was sued for running a campaign adver-
tisement that purportedly included a false assertion of fact.8  Part II 
presents the legal and policy issues underlying the question of 
whether deceptive campaign speech should be regulated.  Part III 
compares the reasons for and against the regulation of deceptive 
campaign speech with the arguments for and against a particular type 
of campaign finance regulation, the prohibition of corporate cam-
paigns expenditures,9 and contends that the differences are not so 
substantial as to justify a different result in the constitutional balance.  
Accordingly, the section suggests that because McConnell upheld re-
strictions on corporate expenditures, its implication, for better or 
worse, is that restrictions on deceptive campaign speech would also be 
upheld.  Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
 
6 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (holding that deliberate falsity 
is not protected under the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279-80 (1964) (establishing that a public official cannot recover damages “for a de-
famatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not”).  But see State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n 
v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 693 (Wash. 1998) (holding unconstitutional a 
state statute that prohibited “any person from sponsoring, with actual malice, a politi-
cal advertisement containing a false statement of material fact”). 
7 See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 (holding that the use of known falsity in public de-
bate is at odds with democratic principles). 
8 Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
9 The reason for focusing specifically on corporate campaign expenditures is that 
the state interests supporting its regulation are the most analogous to those that sup-
port deceptive campaign speech regulation.  See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying 
text. 
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I.  DECEPTIVE CAMPAIGN SPEECH AND THE CASE OF  
BOYCE & ISLEY, PLLC V. COOPER 
In his 2000 race for North Carolina Attorney General, Roy Cooper 
ran the following ad: 
I’m Roy Cooper, candidate for Attorney General, and I sponsored this 
ad. 
. . . . 
Dan Boyce—his law firm sued the state, charging $28,000 an hour in 
lawyer fees to the taxpayers. 
The Judge said it shocks the conscience. 
Dan Boyce’s law firm wanted more than a police officer’s salary for each 
hour’s work. 
Dan Boyce, wrong for Attorney General.
10
 
The lawsuit referred to in Cooper’s ad was Smith v. State,11 a civil 
action that challenged the constitutionality of a state intangibles tax 
and sought refunds totaling approximately $150,000,000 for intangi-
bles taxes paid.  The specific allegation contained in the ad referred 
to the fact that the plaintiffs’ counsel in the case requested a fee of 
$23,000,000 after the court had entered a judgment on behalf of a 
class of protesting taxpayers.  Responding to this request, the presid-
ing judge in the case stated that the amount “would yield Class Coun-
sel a windfall payment of over $28,174.00 per hour” and that such a 
request “shocks the conscience of the Court.”12 
Cooper’s ad triggered a legal response of its own in the form of 
both a defamation action13 and a complaint before the North Carolina 
Board of Elections alleging that Cooper had violated a state provision 
which prohibited any person from publishing derogatory reports with 
respect to any candidate, knowing the report to be false or in reckless 
disregard of its truth, when the reports are meant to hurt the candi-
date’s chances for election.14  Both actions were predicated upon one 
 
10 Boyce & Isley, 568 S.E.2d at 897. 
11 No. 95 CVS 6715 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 1997).  
12 Id., slip op. at 67-68.  While not explicitly referencing the salaries of police offi-
cers, the presiding judge added that the hourly rate requested was “more than the an-
nual salary paid to a starting school teacher.”  Id. at 68. 
13 The plaintiffs in the defamation action were the law firm of Boyce & Isley and 
its member attorneys Dan Boyce, Eugene Boyce, Laura Isley, and Philip Isley.  Boyce & 
Isley, 568 S.E.2d at 896. 
14 Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(8) (2001)). 
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key false statement in the campaign ad.15  The plaintiffs contended that 
the firm never “charged” the state $28,000 per hour, per the defen-
dants’ advertisement; rather, the taxpayers’ counsel merely “sought” 
attorneys’ fees from the state based on the amount of the recovery ob-
tained.16 
The trial court dismissed the case on grounds that the facts as al-
leged did not state a valid claim for defamation, and the Board of 
Elections dismissed the complaint on grounds that it was true and 
published in good faith.17  The North Carolina Court of Appeals held 
that the trial court erred in dismissing the defamation claim.18  Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the claim that attorneys “charged” the 
state $28,000 per hour was both false and defamatory.19  While con-
ceding that an ad claiming that the law firm “sought” the fee would 
not be defamatory, the appellate court nevertheless concluded that 
the allegation that the law firm “charged” the fee had a different 
meaning altogether.  As the court explained: 
Defendants’ advertisement did not state that plaintiffs sought a very large 
fee—it stated that plaintiffs charged a very large fee.  There is an impor-
tant distinction between these two words, of which defendants, in craft-
ing the text of their advertisement, were undoubtedly aware.  The word 
“sought” or “seeking” indicates that plaintiffs submitted their request for 
compensation to the court.  The fact that plaintiffs sought extraordinary 
compensation, moreover, does not imply that plaintiffs actually received 
such compensation.  In contrast, the term “charged” or “charging” sug-
gests that, not only did plaintiffs actually receive such compensation at 
the taxpayers’ expense, they did so without deference to the court.  Con-
trary to defendants’ argument, we do not believe the average layperson 
to be so familiar with the intricacies of class-action lawsuits as to know 
that the courts must approve of attorney compensation in such suits. 
 
15 A second “false” statement in the ad was also relevant to the litigation.  Al-
though the ad claimed that Dan Boyce’s law firm sued the state, the reality was that his 
firm (Boyce & Isley) was not formed until 1999, while the Smith litigation was brought 
in 1997.  In fact, Dan Boyce was not even the counsel of record in the Smith case.  
Rather, the litigation was conducted by his father, Eugene Boyce.  Dan Boyce, however, 
claimed involvement in the Smith case as a campaign issue to demonstrate his com-
mitment to fight for North Carolina taxpayers.  In the subsequent defamation action, 
Cooper tried to argue that Dan Boyce’s law firm did not exist at the time of the Smith 
litigation in order to sustain his defense that the ad could not be construed as “of and 
concerning” the current members of the firm (other than Dan Boyce), as required 
under North Carolina defamation law.  The appellate court, however, rejected this ar-
gument.  Boyce & Isley, 568 S.E.2d at 900. 
16 Id. at 898-99. 
17 Id. at 897, 903. 
18 Id. at 901. 
19 Id. at 899. 
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 Further, defendants’ advertisement did not indicate that the case for 
which plaintiffs purportedly “charged” the taxpayers exorbitant fees was 
a large class-action lawsuit.  Nor did it mention the term “contingency 
fees.”  Without this vital information to lend context to the facts as por-
trayed in the advertisement, the average viewer could not properly 
evaluate the claims being made by defendants against plaintiffs.  Instead, 
the average viewer was left solely with the following information about 
plaintiffs:  that they (1) sued the State; (2) charged (and therefore re-
ceived) $28,000 per hour to taxpayers to do so; (3) that this sum repre-
sented more than a policeman’s annual salary; and (4) that a judge had 
pronounced that plaintiffs’ behavior “shocked the conscience.”20 
Cooper’s ad, in short, was actionable.21 
From the perspective of fostering an informed electorate, the ap-
pellate court decision has much to say in its favor.  Certainly, the vot-
ers would have been more informed if Cooper’s ad had pointed out 
that Smith v. State was a class action, or that any request for attorneys’ 
fees would have to be approved by a court.  They would also have 
been better informed if Cooper’s ad had explained contingency fees 
and how such fees are normally determined.  And perhaps, armed 
with all this extra knowledge, the voters might have been in a better 
position to evaluate whether Dan Boyce was “wrong for Attorney Gen-
eral.” 
For anyone who has ever been involved in a political campaign, 
however, the result in Boyce & Isley has to be disconcerting.  By con-
temporary standards, Cooper’s ad was relatively tame both in terms of 
the subject matter addressed and the rhetoric used.22  Nor was the ad 
unique in its failure to fully and fairly explain the background facts 
upon which it was based.  For better or worse, such niceties are not a 
part of modern campaigning.  Rather, modern political advertisements 
are not intended to be particularly informative in the sense of offering 
 
20 Id. 
21 The appellate court went on to conclude that the false statements were also de-
famatory.  Id. at 899-900. 
22 Consider the following television ad run by an organization calling itself Citi-
zens for Reform in a closely contested 1996 Montana House race between Republican 
Rick Hill and Democrat Bill Yellowtail:  “Who is Bill Yellowtail?  He preaches family 
values, but he took a swing at his wife.  And Yellowtail’s explanation?  He ‘only slapped 
her.’  But her nose was broken.”  See DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y 
CTR., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 4, 22 (1997) (quoting 
the ad), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/03_political_ 
communication/issueads/REP16.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).  The ad “was cited by 
political analysts as tipping a tight race to Hill, who eventually won with 52[%] of the 
vote.”  Id. at 4. 
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in-depth discussions of the issues.23  They are generally less than thirty 
seconds long, designed primarily to elicit emotional response rather 
than convey rational persuasion, and purposefully one-sided and ma-
nipulative.24  Rewriting those ads consistent with the instructions of 
the appellate court’s decision would dramatically change the nature 
and tone of modern political engagement, particularly because cam-
paign ads are currently the most important and commonly used forms 
of political communication.25 
Still, even if at odds with contemporary campaign practices, it is 
not clear that the decision is wrong as a matter of constitutional law.  
Cooper’s most obvious constitutional claims were that the ad was not 
published with “actual malice” as required under New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,26 and that the ad was mere hyperbole, requiring that the 
complaint be dismissed under Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.27  Nei-
ther contention is easily supported by the facts of the case.  The actual 
malice requirement protects the defendant in circumstances where 
she does not know that her statements are false and does not act with 
reckless disregard for the truth.28  In this case, Cooper likely knew that 
 
23 See Helen Desfosess, Voters Must Reclaim the Democratic Process, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany, N.Y.), Dec. 13, 1998, at E1 (“[A]ds rarely cover the issues, or provide only the 
briefest of glimpses.”). 
24 Timothy J. Moran, Format Restrictions on Televised Political Advertising: Elevating 
Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663, 666-72 (1992). 
25 The relative dominance of broadcast advertisement over other forms of political 
advertisements was well documented in the McConnell litigation.  As the record in the 
case established, short broadcast ads are the favored tool of political communication in 
contemporary politics.  McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569-73 (D.D.C.), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part, 121 S. Ct. 619 (2003).   Moreover, in addition to being the po-
litical advertisers’ vehicle of choice, broadcast ads may also be the most important 
source of information to voters.  Moran, supra note 24, at 665 n.6.  For a more in-depth 
discussion of the importance of paid advertising to political campaigns, see William P. 
Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 361-
66 (2000). 
26 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
27 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter 
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974) (holding that there is no liability for state-
ments that are “merely rhetorical hyperbole”); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. 
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding that “rhetorical hyperbole” is not actionable as 
defamation). 
28 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.  In any event, the actual malice standard would not 
apply to the plaintiffs in Boyce & Isley who were only private figures, i.e., the members 
of Boyce’s firm other than Dan Boyce himself.  Under Sullivan and its progeny, only 
public officials or public figures have to show actual malice.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“[S]o long as they do not impose liability with-
out fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for 
a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”).  
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the plaintiffs had “sought” and not “charged” the attorneys’ fees (at 
least in the sense of how the appellate court interpreted those words).  
His defense, rather, was that the purported difference in meaning be-
tween “sought” and “charged” was too insignificant to be actionable.29  
The hyperbole defense, in turn, would be triggered only if the state-
ment, by its very outrageousness, would not be believable by the view-
ers.30  In this respect, although perhaps a close call, the statement that 
a lawyer is “charging” $28,000 per hour may not be so unbelievable as 
to fall within constitutional protection. 
The court of appeals could have been more deferential to the 
First Amendment concerns at stake, given that the case arose out of a 
political campaign.  It might have held, for example, that because 
campaign ads are often hyperbolic (and perceived as such),31 the Con-
stitution demands greater latitude in the definition of hyperbole in 
the campaign speech context.  Alternatively or additionally, the appel-
late court might have adopted a more expansive view of actual malice 
or required an “innocent construction rule” in election speech cases.32  
Indeed, the appellate court could have held that the First Amendment 
should be construed to prohibit the banning of false statements of fact 
in political campaigns, as the Supreme Court of Washington recently 
held in the context of a ballot initiative.33 
To this point, the United States Supreme Court has not sent a 
clear signal that greater sensitivity to First Amendment concerns in 
cases involving campaign speech is in order.  Indeed, it is not at all 
clear under existing precedent that even if the Court were to treat 
 
Even the private figure plaintiffs in Boyce & Isley, however, would have to show actual 
malice under the state campaign practices law.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(8) (2001). 
29 Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 899 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). 
30 The test for hyperbole announced in Hustler was whether the speech “could not 
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts.”  485 U.S. at 50. 
31 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S 765, 780 (2002) (“[O]ne would 
be naive not to recognize that campaign promises are–-by long democratic tradition–-
the least binding form of human commitment . . . .”). 
32 Innocent construction rules require that a statement that can be read to have 
both a defamatory and nondefamatory meaning must be interpreted as nondefama-
tory.  See Babb v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 757 (7th Cir. 1968) (describing Illinois’ com-
mon law innocent construction rule).  Oregon employs a variation of this rule in the 
election speech context.  See, e.g., Comm. of One Thousand to Re-Elect State Senator 
Walt Brown v. Eivers, 674 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Or. 1983) (requiring that a statement that 
can be interpreted as factually correct or as opinion must be interpreted as such even 
though it could also be interpreted as factually incorrect). 
33 State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 697-
99 (Wash. 1998).  119 Vote No! Committee did not hold, however, that defamatory false state-
ments of fact could not be proscribed.  Id. 
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campaign speech as distinct from speech in other contexts, its solu-
tion would be to demand greater constitutional protection for the 
former.  Justices Scalia34 and Breyer,35 for example, have separately 
suggested that because of the state’s interests in fostering an informed 
electorate and in protecting the integrity of the political process are so 
strong, the state may have greater power to regulate election speech 
than speech in other areas.36  Moreover, regulating false campaign 
speech may be seen as uncontroversial because it has been held that 
there is no First Amendment value in false statements of fact.37  In any 
event, whether the Constitution demands greater latitude for cam-
paign speech than for speech in other areas remains an open ques-
tion.  Resolution of this issue, however, requires some investigation 
into the competing values at stake.  It is to this project we now turn. 
II.  REGULATING DECEPTIVE CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
A.  The Arguments in Favor 
Although the contention that false campaign ads trigger regula-
 
34 As Justice Scalia noted in dissent in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 
U.S. 334 (1995): 
The . . . question is whether protection of the election process justifies limita-
tions upon speech that cannot constitutionally be imposed generally. . . . Our 
cases plainly answer that question in the affirmative—indeed, they suggest 
that no justification for regulation is more compelling than protection of the 
electoral process.  Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to 
vote is undermined.  The State has a compelling interest in preserving the in-
tegrity of its election process.  So significant have we found the interest in pro-
tecting the electoral process to be that we have approved the prohibition of 
political speech entirely in areas that would impede that process. 
Id. at 378-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
35 See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 
(2002) (“[I]mportant First Amendment-related interests lie on both sides of the consti-
tutional equation, and . . . a First Amendment presumption hostile to government 
regulation, such as ‘strict scrutiny,’ is consequently out of place.”). 
36 The question of whether election speech should be treated differently from 
other categories of speech has produced some particularly excellent commentary.  See 
Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy:  Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1751, 1776-80 (1999) (arguing that a special category of election speech could be rec-
ognized under the First Amendment); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral 
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1803-05 (1999) (discussing 
whether a special category of election speech should be recognized); see also Gerken, 
supra note 2, at 739-40 (summarizing the election law exceptionalism case history). 
37 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S 323, 340 (1974); see also supra notes 26-28 
and accompanying text (discussing the “actual malice” exception to the constitutional 
defense). 
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tory concerns is anything but controversial, it is still worthwhile to ex-
amine some of the specific harms that they can engender.  First, and 
most obviously, false statements can distort the electoral process.  
Democracy is premised on an informed electorate.  Thus, to the ex-
tent that false ads misinform the voters, they interfere with the process 
upon which democracy is based.38  After all, if a campaign statement 
convinces voters that by voting for candidate A, they will elect some-
one who supports policy Z, when the truth is that candidate A opposes 
policy Z, the result of the election is distorted.  As the Court stated in 
Garrison v. Louisiana, “the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at 
odds with the premises of democratic government and with the or-
derly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be 
effected.”39 
Second, false statements can serve to lower the quality of cam-
paign discourse and debate.40  Campaign attack ads often force oppo-
nents to respond to the specific attack or engage in similar tactics 
themselves.41  The result is that campaigns degenerate into cycles of 
attack and denial rather than serious engagement on major issues.42  
Moreover, even if a candidate decides not to engage in similar tactics, 
except to “correct” a misimpression created by an opponent, the re-
sult may be only to distract the voters from substantive issues.  Con-
sider the ad at issue in Boyce & Isley.  If Boyce wanted to correct what 
 
38 See Jack Winsbro, Comment, Misrepresentation in Political Advertising:  The Role of 
Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 863 (1987) (arguing that misinformation allows 
elections to “turn on rumors, innuendo, and outright fabrication, in effect defeating 
the entire electoral process”). 
39 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
40 Deceit in political advertising “lowers the level of political conversation.”  Mar-
tha M. Hamilton, Cleaning Up the Mudslinging:  Ad Executive Proposes Self-Regulating Body 
to Police Political Commercials, WASH. POST, July 30, 1996, at C1 (quoting Burt Manning, 
former chairman of the American Association of Advertising Agencies). 
41 A candidate may choose not to respond to a misrepresentation but that strategy 
poses its own risks.  Unanswered charges tend to gain resonance and credibility par-
ticularly with the passage of time.  One instance where failing to answer a campaign ad 
proved to be a serious miscalculation is the recent Georgia Senate race between Saxby 
Chambliss and Max Cleland.  Chambliss ran a series of ads using an image of Osama 
bin Laden in attacking Cleland’s refusal to back President Bush’s homeland security 
proposal.  The ad implied that in failing to vote for the President’s proposal, Cleland 
was effectively giving support to terrorists.  Cleland did not respond and in the end lost 
an election that he had been heavily favored to win.  Andrea Stone, Long Shot Played to 
Pro-Military Voters, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2002, at 5A. 
42 See Peter F. May, Note, State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising:  Stemming 
the Tide of Deceptive Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REV. 179, 187 (1992) (arguing that nega-
tive attacks trigger a negative attack response, “thereby fueling an escalating ‘arms 
race’ of attack advertisements”). 
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he believed was misinformation in the ad, he would have had to de-
vote resources to informing the electorate as to the difference in 
meaning between the terms “sought” and “charged.”  This, in turn, 
might have led to a response from Cooper contending that his origi-
nal ad was perfectly accurate.  Whether the voters would be better in-
formed in their electoral choices if the campaign were to devolve into 
this sort of debate is doubtful. 
Third, false statements can lead or add to voter alienation by fos-
tering voter cynicism and distrust of the political process.43  Voter al-
ienation is problematic in a number of respects, not the least of which 
is that it decreases voter turnout.44  When a majority of citizens do not 
participate in the democratic process, the resulting political decisions 
represent only the preferences of the few, arguably negating the de-
mocratic premise.  For this reason, some theorists have contended 
that democratic decision making is illegitimate unless there is signifi-
cant voter turnout.45  Additionally, suppressed voter turnout imposes 
collateral harms on the individual and on her relationship to her po-
litical community.  If voting, as Pamela Karlan suggests, “is a way of 
declaring one’s full membership in the political community,”46 then 
 
43 Michael Kimmel, A Proposal to Strengthen the Right of Response to Negative Campaign 
Commercials, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 89, 90 (1999). 
44 The fact that negative attacks can suppress voter turnout, STEPHEN 
ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE:  HOW ATTACK ADS SHRINK AND 
POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 9 (1995), and at times are designed to suppress voter turn-
out, Clay Calvert, When First Amendment Principles Collide:  Negative Political Advertising & 
the Demobilization of Democratic Self-Governance, 30 LOY. L. REV. 1539, 1540 (1997) (citing 
ANSOLABEHERE & IYENGAR, supra, at 9), is well documented.  For an opposing view, see 
Martin P. Wattenburg & Craig Leonard Brians, Negative Campaign Advertising:  Demobi-
lizer or Mobilizer?, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891, 893 (1999) (arguing that negative advertis-
ing increases voter turnout). 
45 See Robert H. Salisbury, Research on Political Participation, 19 AM. J. POL. SCI. 323, 
326-27 (1975) (referring to political participation as a “legitimizing act”).  Some have 
argued, however, that the concerns about low voter turnout are overstated.  According 
to this view, low voter turnout may more accurately represent satisfaction with the po-
litical process than abdication of political choice.  See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, In 
Praise of Low Voter Turnout, TIME, May 21, 1990, at 88 (stating that “[l]ow voter turn-
out is a leading indicator of contentment”).  But see FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. 
CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE 113-21 (1988) (criticizing the view that not 
voting is an endorsement of the status quo).  One study, in fact, suggests that the po-
litical positions of those who do not vote are not significantly different from the posi-
tions of those who do.  Stephen E. Bennett & David Resnick, The Implications of Nonvot-
ing for Democracy in the United States, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 771, 777-87 (1990).  Nonvoters, 
however, are generally less informed.  See JACK C. DOPPELT & ELLEN SHEARER, NONVOTERS:  
AMERICA’S NO-SHOWS 25-27 (1999) (arguing that nonvoters are less interested in po-
litical or public policy news than those who vote). 
46 Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by Virtue Won?  Vote Trafficking and the Voting 
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campaign tactics that discourage the individual from voting interfere 
with this connection.  Moreover, even beyond concerns with low voter 
turnout, a healthy democracy depends upon an involved electorate 
for the simple reason that in a democratic system it is the citizenry 
that is entrusted with making political decisions.47  An electorate that 
becomes so turned off and disengaged from the political process is 
both unable to fulfill its democratic function and rife for manipula-
tion.  As Justice Brandeis once famously observed, “the greatest men-
ace to freedom is an inert people.”48 
Fourth, false statements against an opponent’s character can in-
flict reputational and emotional injury upon the attacked individual.49  
These harms may be serious enough outside the campaign context, 
but in the case of political campaigns, the harms inflicted may affect 
more than just the disparaged candidate.  For one, a regulatory re-
gime that allows unrestricted campaign attack ads can deter qualified 
individuals from seeking political office.50  In addition, the constant 
and unchecked derogation of political actors can harm the integrity of 
the democratic community.  As Robert Bellah has argued, the reputa-
tion of political leaders is, in effect, a “public good” that reinforces 
community identity and hegemony.51  Damaging the reputation of po-
litical leaders thus harms the community as well as the leaders them-
selves.52 
 
Rights System, 80 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1465 (1994). 
47 See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-91 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing 
the importance of an involved citizenry in ensuring the viability of the American 
model of self-governance); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF FREE SPEECH 249 (1993) (noting that “the American conception of sovereignty 
[puts] governing authority in the people themselves”). 
48 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
49 For an outstanding account examining the harms incurred by defamation, see 
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law:  Reputation and the Constitution, 
74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986). 
50 May, supra note 42, at 186-87. 
51 Bellah noted that 
[t]o a considerable degree the reputation of a community is reflected in the 
reputation of its representative figures.  Indeed, it is the founders and heroes 
of a community that to a considerable extent give it its identity, and it is the 
memory of the sufferings and achievements of exemplary figures that consti-
tutes a community as a community of memory and keeps that community 
alive. 
Robert H. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L. REV. 743, 745 
(1986). 
52 In this sense, the defamation of political actors reinforces the citizen alienation 
discussed above, supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
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B.  The Arguments Against 
Despite the strength of the case in favor of restricting false cam-
paign statements, the arguments in favor are not one-sided.  First, as 
an introductory matter, the arguments in favor of regulation may 
overstate the harms.  For example, the regulatory concern of prevent-
ing candidates from deceiving voters may miss the point that voters 
often do not believe what they hear in campaigns anyway.53  As one 
commentator has observed, “[i]t is, after all, a basic tenet of American 
folk wisdom that politicians’ utterances are virtually never inhibited by 
considerations of truthfulness or accuracy.”54  Moreover, the threat to 
truth posed by false or deceptive campaign statements may not be as 
great as in other areas because in the context of a campaign there is 
always a very heavily motivated party set to expose the candidate’s de-
ceptions, i.e., the candidate’s opponent.  For this reason, misstate-
ments in a political campaign are unlikely to ever go unanswered.55 
Moreover, sanctioning false campaign speech may not, in any 
event, be an effective way of informing the public.  For one, adjudicat-
ing false speech claims is likely to take far longer than the election cy-
cle, so a formal decision on the truth or falsity of a campaign claim 
likely will not happen until it is too late.56  In addition, false statements 
may actually serve to make the public more informed.  Voters may 
learn much about their candidates in the context of a battle over 
whether a campaign statement was true or not.  The sponsoring can-
didate must prove to the voters that she can defend her assertion.  
The candidate alleging falsity, in turn, must demonstrate she is not 
unfairly crying foul.  Indeed, although negativity can at times suppress 
voter turnout, the charges and countercharges over purported false 
 
53 Winsbro, supra note 38, at 859. 
54 Id. 
55 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 62 (1982) (“In a political campaign, a candi-
date’s factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring 
candidate’s political opponent.”).  This assumes, of course, that the erring candidate’s 
opponent has the resources to respond to the attack. 
56 The remedy of judicial invalidation of the election in which a false statement 
has been uttered is, of course, possible.  See, e.g., id. at 55 (noting that “some kinds of 
promises made by a candidate to voters, and some kinds of promises elicited by voters 
from candidates, may be declared illegal without constitutional difficulty”).  Professor 
Issacharoff also informs me that some other countries invalidate elections if a candi-
date has violated campaign speech laws.  See, e.g., Prabhoo v. Kunte, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 
1113, 1130 (India) (interpreting an Indian statute as requiring elections to be “free 
from the unhealthy influence of appeals to religion, caste, community, or language,” 
with the penalty for a candidate’s transgressions being the voidance of her election to 
office). 
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statements can paradoxically serve to generate voter interest.  False 
statements, and their resulting controversies, may infuse a campaign 
with a drama and urgency that it otherwise lacks. 
Second and more importantly, restricting campaign speech, in-
cluding even false campaign speech, is in tension with basic free 
speech principles.  The discussion of political affairs lies at the heart 
of the First Amendment.57  As the Supreme Court stated in Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White,58 “[d]ebate on the qualifications of candi-
dates is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amend-
ment freedoms, not at the edges.”59  Accordingly, allowing government 
to regulate speech in this area, even with respect to false statements 
alone, raises strong First Amendment concerns.60  Moreover, even if 
falsity itself has no inherent value, sanctioning false statements in the 
context of a political campaign can be particularly harsh.  Battling 
one’s opponent is what campaigning is all about.61  Campaigns involve 
a constant give and take between opposing candidates, and the possi-
bility that candidates will say something false and derogatory about 
their opponents is not insignificant.  Subjecting statements made in 
the heat of a campaign to potential sanctions can therefore have a 
particularly powerful chilling effect.62  Additionally, proscribing false 
 
57 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free dis-
cussion of governmental affairs.”). 
58 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
59 Id. at 781 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 As the Court stated in Brown v. Hartlage:  “Of course, demonstrable falsehoods 
are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.  
But erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the 
freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they need . . . to survive.”  
456 U.S. at 60 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, ellipses in original). 
61 For this reason, it is not surprising that one of the Court’s most speech-
protective defamation decisions arose in the context of a political campaign.  In St. 
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Court held that a defendant had no duty 
to investigate the falsity of her statements in order to avoid liability for defamation un-
der the actual malice standard.  Id. at 733.  In St. Amant, a candidate was sued for re-
marks he made about the plaintiff in a televised campaign speech.  Id. at 728.  In that 
speech, the candidate suggested that the plaintiff engaged in criminal conduct al-
though he had no knowledge of this fact and his only information on the subject came 
from a third person.  Id. at 728-29.  Nevertheless, the Court found that the defendant 
had not acted with reckless disregard for the truth.  Although the Court itself recog-
nized that its decision might be thought to place “a premium on ignorance and [to] 
encourage[] the irresponsible publisher not to inquire,” id. at 731, it nevertheless 
found its result to be required under the First Amendment.  Id. at 732. 
62 But see Thomas Kane, Note, Malice, Lies, and Videotape:  Revisiting New York 
Times v. Sullivan in the Modern Age of Political Campaigns, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 755, 801 
(1999) (dismissing the argument that sanctioning false statements will overly chill 
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political speech is constitutionally problematic because it empowers 
the government to decide what is true and false in politics.  Theoreti-
cally, in a democracy, the people and not the government are the ar-
biters of political truth.  Removing the truth-finding function from the 
people, who as voters are entrusted with that power, offends this con-
stitutional ideal.  In the words of the Court, “every person must be his 
own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any 
government to separate the true from the false for us.”63 
Third, authorizing the government to decide what is true or false 
in campaign speech opens the door to partisan abuse.  After all, de-
termining what is true and false in political campaigns can be notori-
ously difficult64 given that in politics, in the Court’s own words, “the 
tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor.”65  Ac-
cordingly, the question of whether a statement will be viewed as true 
or false, as fact or hyperbole, might depend largely on the perspective 
and/or the motivation of the decision maker.  Whether courts or ad-
ministrative agencies are sufficiently insulated from political pressure 
to decide these cases fairly is therefore a legitimate concern.66 
 
 
campaign speech).  Kane argues that the chilling effect is overstated because campaign 
speech is similar to commercial speech in that it shares the latter’s durability—i.e., 
since campaign speech, like commercial speech, must be disseminated in order for the 
candidate to achieve her goals, she is unlikely to be chilled from presenting her posi-
tion.  Id. at 810-11. 
63 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419-20 (1988) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  Indeed, relying primarily on this rationale, the Supreme Court of Washington 
recently held that a state statute prohibiting any person from sponsoring a political ad 
with a false statement of material fact was unconstitutional with respect to statements 
made in the context of a public initiative campaign, even though the statute predi-
cated liability upon the advertiser publishing with actual malice.  State ex rel. Pub. Dis-
closure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 699 (Wash. 1998).  For the 
Washington court, the State had no “independent right to determine truth and falsity 
in political debate. . . . Rather, the First Amendment operates to insure the public de-
cides what is true and false with respect to governance.”  Id. at 695.  The court, how-
ever, suggested that the law might be upheld with respect to defamatory false state-
ments because of the state’s legitimate interest in protecting individuals’ reputations.  
Id. at 697. 
64 See Winsbro, supra note 38, at 868 (“[I]t is indubitable that the peculiar and 
unique features of campaign speech require that it receive the utmost protection.  In 
no other area, except perhaps that of religion, is there likely to be less unanimity, 
among ‘experts’ or otherwise, as to whether a given statement is ‘true’ or ‘false.’”). 
65 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). 
66 See generally Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for 
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 676 
(2002) (noting that judges, like politicians, may be motivated by partisan concerns in 
their redistricting decisions). 
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Fourth, regulating campaign speech is problematic because it al-
lows the courts and/or other regulatory bodies to be used as political 
weapons.  Bringing defamation or campaign practices actions against 
a candidate who has purportedly disseminated false statements is not 
always only about correcting the record or remedying injury to reputa-
tion.  It is often also about inflicting political damage.67  In this re-
spect, the lawsuit itself can be a weapon of substantial political force.68  
It is dramatic (and therefore likely to generate news coverage), and it 
gives the perception of gravity to the candidate-complainant’s claim of 
misfeasance.69  Moreover, the legal action can inflict political harm on 
the candidate-complainant’s opponent that extends well beyond the 
election cycle, even if the opponent ultimately prevails in the election.  
The post-election legal proceedings can keep the story of the alleged 
falsehood in the news and minds of the voters, and the litigation can 
distract the defendant-office holder from carrying out her responsi-
bilities.  Perhaps this would be beneficial if the defendant-office 
holder gained elective office by deceptive tactics, but the possibility 
also exists that the lawsuit itself may turn out to be the dirty trick.  In 
any case, the availability of a lawsuit could become as much a partisan 
campaign tactic as the problem it is designed to address. 
III.  CAMPAIGN SPEECH AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
The constitutional assessment of campaign finance regulation also 
involves a weighing of strong competing interests.  On the side of sus-
taining campaign finance regulations, these include eliminating cor-
ruption and/or the appearance of corruption,70 promoting political 
 
67 See BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS:  
POLITICIANS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE PRESS FROM WATERGATE TO WHITEWATER 14 (3d 
ed. 2002) (noting the use of judicial actions to damage political opponents). 
68 One needs no better example than Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), to es-
tablish this point irrefutably. 
69 At the same time, the candidate-complainant is relatively insulated from nega-
tive repercussions if the complaint is nonmeritorious.  First of all, a motion to dismiss 
seldom generates as much news coverage as the original complaint, and even a request 
for Rule 11 sanctions is unlikely to attract much attention.  Second, any actual decision 
on the merits is unlikely to be made until after the campaign is finished, so any elec-
toral damage done to the defendant would be long over. 
70 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam) (“To the extent 
that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo’ from current and 
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is un-
dermined.”); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform:  The Root of All Evil 
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 302 (1989) (describing the practice of paying 
“money to bias the judgment or sway the loyalty of persons holding positions of public 
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equality,71 limiting the demands on candidate time and resources,72 
and improving campaign discourse.73  Meanwhile, on the other side, 
concerns include restricting core First Amendment activity,74 creating 
the risk of legislative entrenchment by empowering those enacting 
such measures to adopt rules that might potentially favor incum-
bents,75 creating the risk that those charged with enforcing these rules 
may use their authority in a partisan manner,76 and providing the can-
didates with yet another and potentially distracting political weapon—
 
trust” as “corrupt”). 
71 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter:  A Constitutional Principle of Cam-
paign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1994) (advocating for an “equal-dollars-
per-voter” approach that would “guarantee to each eligible voter equal financial re-
sources for purposes of supporting or opposing any candidate or initiative on the bal-
lot,” thereby fostering the equality of each voter’s voice); Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of 
American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19, 23 (discussing the political ine-
qualities between rich and poor that are fostered by the campaign finance system). 
 There are actually four subsets to the political equality interest.  The first is reduc-
ing the electoral advantages of wealthy candidates.  The second is promoting the equal 
ability of individuals and groups to influence elections.  The third is limiting the ad-
vantage of campaign donors to access elected officials and thereby influence the prod-
ucts of legislation in their favor.  Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy:  An 
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 28-35 
(1996).  The fourth is protecting against the ability of wealthy interests to distort elec-
toral decision making in their favor by flooding the avenues of political communica-
tion.  John C. Bonifaz et al., Challenging Buckley v. Valeo:  A Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. 
REV. 39, 60 (1999). 
72 See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising:  Why Campaign 
Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 
1282-83 (1994) (arguing that a primary goal of campaign finance reform should be “to 
protect the time of elected representatives and candidates for office”).  This concern 
may also be related to the interest in not deterring qualified candidates from seeking 
elective office. 
73 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 893, 898-99 (1998) (stating that campaign finance reform may lessen the legis-
lator’s incentive to serve contributors rather than constituents, thus improving the 
quality of political decision making (discussing J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitu-
tion:  Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and 
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994)). 
74 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (“[C]ontribution and expenditure limitations operate 
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”). 
75 Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review:  The Entrenchment Problem, 85 
GEO. L.J. 491, 536-38 (1997) (noting the problems of incumbent self-dealing that at-
tend campaign finance regulation); see also Robert F. Bauer, When “the Pols Make the 
Calls”:  McConnell’s Theory of Judicial Deference in the Twilight of Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 5, 19 n.84 (2004) (arguing that the Court only gave “summary attention” to the 
critique that BCRA was an incumbent protection plan). 
76 See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 637 (2003) (noting the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that restrictions on “coordinated” campaign expenditures could trigger “intru-
sive and politically motivated [enforcement] investigations”). 
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the accusation that one’s opponent has violated campaign finance 
laws.77  Moreover, as with campaign speech regulation, there is a fair 
argument to be made that regulating campaign finance may be coun-
terproductive.  Limiting the amount of money in politics, for exam-
ple, may adversely affect the interest in fostering an informed elector-
ate,78 while subjecting political campaigns to complex regulatory 
requirements only increases the financial barriers to prospective can-
didacies. 
Unlike campaign speech, however, campaign finance has gener-
ated a relatively developed jurisprudence.  Reference to that jurispru-
dence, therefore, may be helpful in sorting out the campaign speech 
issues, particularly because the competing interests on both sides of 
the campaign finance and campaign speech debates closely parallel 
each other.  Indeed, as we shall see, the correlation between the com-
peting interests present in campaign finance and campaign speech 
regulation is virtually identical in the case of the constitutionality of 
restrictions on corporate and labor union campaign expenditures 
(corporate expenditures).79  For this reason, comparing campaign 
speech issues with the Court’s corporate campaign expenditure deci-
sions may be an optimum point to begin our discussion. 
Most obviously, the First Amendment interests at stake in both de-
ceptive campaign speech and corporate expenditure regulations are 
similar.  In both circumstances, core First Amendment concerns are 
implicated because the activity sought to be regulated is political.  Less 
 
77 The claim that President Clinton violated campaign finance laws in his 1996 re-
election campaign resulted in numerous investigations of his administration.  See gener-
ally LANNY J. DAVIS, TRUTH TO TELL:  TELL IT EARLY, TELL IT ALL, TELL IT YOURSELF 
(1999) (discussing the partisan investigations of President Clinton’s campaign fund-
raising in the 1996 election). 
78 See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1061 (1996) (arguing that campaign fi-
nance restrictions may limit the amount of campaign information available to the elec-
torate); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 663, 695 (1997) (arguing that campaign finance restrictions would impair politi-
cians’ ability to reach large masses of the electorate). 
79 For purposes of brevity, I will use the term “corporate expenditures” to refer to 
political expenditures by both corporations and labor unions.  In upholding the re-
strictions on campaign expenditures by corporations and labor unions, the Court in 
McConnell relied on its earlier decision in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652 (1990), which upheld limits on political expenditures by corporations 
only.  The extension of Austin to include expenditures by labor unions was not ex-
plained by the Court.  However, as will be discussed infra note 121, the Court’s move to 
treat labor expenditures and corporate expenditures similarly has significant doctrinal 
implications. 
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obviously, the key state interests underlying both regulatory matters 
are also closely parallel.  In the corporate expenditure context, the 
announced state interest upon which the Court has primarily relied80 
is the state interest in preventing corruption and/or the appearance 
of corruption.81  Critically, this anticorruption interest, as interpreted 
by the Court, encompasses the state’s interests in combating voter al-
ienation and campaign distortion—the two key state interests that also 
underlie campaign speech regulation.  Because the tie between the 
anticorruption rationale and the concerns of preventing voter alien-
ation and campaign distortion may not be immediately clear, how-
ever, a word of explanation is in order. 
The government’s interest in preventing corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption has proven to be a highly elastic concept.  As 
applied to provisions limiting campaign contributions, for example, 
the Court has made clear that this interest does not end with eliminat-
ing quid pro quo corruption.82  It also includes curbing the ability of 
contributors to exercise “undue influence on an officeholder’s judg-
ment, and the appearance of such influence.”83  The interest even ex-
tends, after McConnell, to include the state interest in restricting con-
tributions designed only to assure access to public officials.84 
More significantly for our purposes, the Court has expanded the 
anticorruption rationale to take on a different meaning entirely.  No 
longer is the anticorruption interest seen as only a concern with do-
nors purchasing access or influence or otherwise seeking and receiv-
ing special benefits.  Rather, it includes “a different type of corrup-
tion,”85 namely the prevention of campaign distortion caused by the 
 
80 The Court has upheld disclosure provisions based upon the government’s com-
bined interest in “providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corrup-
tion and avoiding its appearance, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more 
substantive electioneering restrictions . . . .”  McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 635.  The Court 
has also upheld some campaign finance provisions on grounds that they serve to pre-
vent circumvention of otherwise valid restrictions.  Id. at 696 (citing FEC v. Beaumont, 
539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)). 
81 See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (“These inter-
ests directly implicate the integrity of our electoral process, and . . . the responsibility 
of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.”). 
82 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 665 & n.48. 
83 Id. at 664 (citing FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 
441 (2001)). 
84 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 746 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (claiming that “[t]he 
Court . . . in effect interprets the anticorruption rationale to allow regulation . . . of any 
conduct that wins goodwill from or influences a Member of Congress”). 
85 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
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infusion of corporate and labor wealth into the political system in a 
manner that skews public debate.86  The Court has been explicit on 
this point.  To the Court, the anticorruption interest includes combat-
ing the “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of corporate forms that 
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corpora-
tion’s political ideas.”87  The only difference is that in campaign 
speech regulation, the concern is with the skewing effects of decep-
tion whereas in the corporate expenditure context, it is with the skew-
ing effects of wealth. 
The state interests accepted by the Court as supporting limits on 
corporate expenditures also include what can only be described as 
antialienation concerns.  According to the Court, restrictions on cor-
porate expenditures are supported by the need to preserve “the indi-
vidual citizen’s confidence in government”88 and to sustain “the active, 
alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the 
wise conduct of the government.”89  Seen as such, the anticorruption 
rationale reflects virtually the exact same antialienation concern that 
supports regulating campaign speech.90 
The recognition that the state interests in corporate expenditure 
regulation are the same as its interests in campaign speech regulation 
is obviously significant for the assessment of the latter’s constitutional-
 
86 Id.  As some have noted, this interest might be more accurately characterized as 
one designed to promote political equality rather than one aimed at than fighting cor-
ruption.  See Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity:  Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 109-10 (arguing that the state interest in preventing the cam-
paign distortion caused by massive infusions of wealth into the political system is actu-
ally an equality interest). 
87 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695-96 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).  Although Aus-
tin addressed only the “corrosive and distorting” effects on elections caused by corpo-
rate wealth, McConnell, without discussion, extended this rationale to support restric-
tions on labor unions’ campaign expenditures as well.  Id. at 690-700.  The Court did 
so, moreover, even though, unlike corporations, the wealth of labor unions may have 
some relation to its political ideals.  See infra note 121 (discussing the McConnell Court’s 
treatment of the constitutionality of campaign expenditure limits on labor unions). 
88 McConnell, 540 S. Ct. at 696 n.88 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978)).  The Court’s solicitude for the state’s interest in not allow-
ing confidence in government to be eroded dates back to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (per curiam), although in that case the Court framed the issue as not allowing 
confidence in government “to be eroded to a disastrous extent.”  Id. at 27 (quoting 
United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 
(1973)) (emphasis added). 
89 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696 n.88 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S at 788-89). 
90 Indeed, this rationale encompasses not only false campaign speech but negative 
campaign speech, whether false or not.  Calvert, supra note 44, at 1540. 
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ity.  If the factors on both sides of the constitutional equation are the 
same, reviewing how those competing interests are weighed in one 
context should offer significant insight into how they might be 
weighed in the other.  At this point, then, the Court’s decision, hold-
ing that the interests of antidistortion and antialienation are suffi-
ciently weighty to sustain corporate expenditure limits against consti-
tutional challenge,91 offers us an early return in our assessment of the 
constitutionality of deceptive speech regulation, suggesting that such 
restrictions should also be upheld.92  The question remains, however, 
whether the state’s interests and their countervailing First Amend-
ment concerns play out differently in the context of corporate expen-
diture than in the deceptive campaign speech context in a manner 
that might lead to a different result.93 
 
91 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695-96; see also supra text accompanying note 87. 
92 The decision upholding limits on corporate expenditures may also offer insight 
into the constitutionality of noncorporate campaign expenditures.  Although thus far, 
the Court has held that the anticorruption interest does not justify restrictions on po-
litical campaign expenditures generally, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45, 53, 56 (finding a 
lack of compelling state interest in restricting what candidates can spend of their own 
wealth), the antidistortion and antialienation interests may arguably support restric-
tions on those expenditures as well on grounds that the infusion of large aggregations 
of wealth from any source may have “distorting and corrosive” effects.  Whether the 
Court is likely to restrict such expenditures after McConnell is anyone’s guess.  Even if it 
holds that the state interests supporting limiting noncorporate and corporate expendi-
tures are similar, that alone would not resolve the constitutional issue.  The Court 
could still distinguish corporate expenditures on grounds that they are of lesser First 
Amendment value.  See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (discussing the ar-
gument that corporate and labor expenditures are lesser-value First Amendment 
speech). 
93 To be sure, one might be tempted to distinguish the restriction on corporate 
expenditures from the restriction on false campaign speech on the grounds that the 
restriction on corporate expenditures, at least according to the Court, is merely a regu-
lation while the restriction on false campaign speech is a complete ban.  After all, the 
McConnell Court argued that because corporations and labor unions were not prohib-
ited from organizing and administering political action committees (PACs) to fund 
campaign speech, “it is simply wrong to view the provision [prohibiting corporate 
campaign expenditures] as a complete ban on expression rather than a regulation.”  
124 S. Ct. at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is unclear, however, why the 
distinction drawn by the Court should have significance.  True, the corporation may be 
able to get its message out through another entity, but it remains prohibited from 
speaking.  The fact that Y can ask, or even direct, X to carry its message should not jus-
tify a direct prohibition on Y ’s own right to speak.  See id. at 768  (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that “[t]he majority can articulate no 
compelling justification for imposing a scheme of compulsory ventriloquism” which 
forces an organization to communicate through an artificial, secondhand structure, 
which in turn distorts that organization’s message).  Indeed, under the Court’s logic, 
one might equally respond that a ban on false campaign speech is not a complete ban 
either.  The campaign speaker remains free to speak truthfully. 
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A.  Campaign Deception or Campaign Money:  Which Holds  
Greater First Amendment Value? 
The first argument that campaign finance analysis should yield a 
different constitutional result than campaign speech regulation is 
that the free speech interests opposing regulation are more powerful 
in one area than another.  The issue can be stated more succinctly:  is 
there a greater First Amendment right to lie or to spend money? 
1.  Are Calculated Falsehoods Protected Speech? 
Despite Charles Fried’s assertion that “[i]n political campaigns the 
grossest misstatements, deceptions, and defamations are immune 
from legal sanction unless they violate private rights,”94 the claim that 
deceptive campaign speech implicates free speech concerns is not 
immediately obvious.  Falsity, after all, has no apparent First Amend-
ment status.  As long ago as Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,95 for example, 
the Court observed that libel was among the classes of speech that are 
not of sufficient value to justify constitutional protection.96  To be 
sure, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan97 undercut the Chaplinsky dictum 
and held that some falsity, specifically defamatory statements about 
public officials, would be constitutionally protected as long as the 
statements were not uttered with “actual malice” meaning knowledge 
of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.98  Sullivan’s reasoning, 
however, was less about the First Amendment value of falsity, although 
the Court gave a nod in that direction,99 than it was about providing 
breathing space for protected expression on grounds that too quickly 
sanctioning falsity would chill public debate.  As the Court stated, “er-
roneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be pro-
 
94 Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:  A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 225, 238 (1992), cited in State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote 
No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 697 (Wash. 1998). 
95 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
96 Id. at 572. 
97 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
98 Id. at 279-80.  Later cases have since made clear that the actual malice standard 
also applies to political candidates.  See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 
271 (1971) (“[I]t is abundantly clear that . . . publications concerning candidates must 
be accorded at least as much protection . . . as those concerning occupants of public 
office.”). 
99 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (“Even a false statement may be deemed to make a 
valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about the clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
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tected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space 
that they need . . . to survive . . . .”100 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,101 the Court again made clear that fal-
sity alone was not entitled to First Amendment protection.  As Gertz 
stated: 
[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. . . . They be-
long to that category of utterances which “are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order and morality.”
102
 
If Gertz is correct, the First Amendment claim for protection of 
false campaign speech must then rest on a rationale similar to Sulli-
van, i.e., that the reasons to protect the speech rest more with prob-
lems of government intervention than with a finding that the state-
ments themselves have inherent value.103  Indeed, this claim must go 
beyond Sullivan if it is to be argued that the protection of false cam-
paign speech should apply to statements uttered with actual malice as 
required in defamation actions or in most state campaign practices 
acts.104 
As we have seen, the arguments in support of such an extension 
are considerable.  First, greater latitude for campaign speech may be 
appropriate because of the heated nature of political campaigns.105  
Second, in election contests specifically, the First Amendment princi-
ple that the final arbiter of political truth should be the people and 
not the government has particular resonance.106  After all, not only are 
the people charged with determining political truth but the ballot box 
gives them the opportunity to do so.  Third, there is a particular dan-
 
100 Id. at 271-72 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
102 Id. at 340 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
103 But see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing the value of falsity 
in political campaigns); supra note 99 (noting that falsity has inherent value in public 
debate). 
104 The requirement that actual malice is required for all campaign speech, how-
ever, would at least protect defendants, like Cooper in Boyce v. Isley, who are sued by 
private figures claiming defamation.  Under existing law, such plaintiffs do not have to 
show actual malice but can predicate liability on negligence.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-48 (1974). 
105 See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text (discussing the need for uninhibi-
ted speech in the campaign environment). 
106 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing how fundamental it is 
to a democracy that the people remain the decision makers). 
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ger in this area for partisan abuse.107  As Geoffrey Stone explains in 
addressing the constitutionality of campaign statutes that prohibit the 
dissemination of false political statements: 
The point is not that government does not have a legitimate interest in 
protecting the quality of public debate.  Surely it does.  It is, rather, that 
there is great danger in authorizing government to involve itself in the 
process in this manner. This danger stems from the possible effect of 
partisanship affecting the process at every level.  The very power to make 




The arguments supporting protection of deceptive campaign 
speech, in fact, recently carried the day before the Washington State 
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote 
No! Committee.109  In that case, the court held that a state statute prohib-
iting false political advertising sponsored in connection with a state 
initiative campaign was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, 
even though the state statute predicated liability upon the advertise-
ment being published with actual malice.110  Whether that case reflects 
the law of the land, however, is unclear.111  As a concurrence in the 
case maintained, “[t]oday the Washington State Supreme Court be-
comes the first court in the history of the Republic to declare First 
Amendment protection for calculated lies.”112  Accordingly, the First 
Amendment status of intentionally deceptive campaign speech re-
mains ambiguous. 
2.  Are Corporate Campaign Expenditures Protected Speech? 
The Court in Buckley concluded that political campaign expendi-
tures generally are entitled to full First Amendment protection113 and 
 
107 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (arguing that this regulation can 
be turned into a weapon for partisanship). 
108 Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 140 (1993). 
109 957 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1998). 
110 Id. at 697. 
111 For example, an Ohio law that similarly sanctioned knowing false statements of 
fact was upheld in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991) and 
McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commission, 729 N.E.2d 364, 375 (Ohio 2000). 
112 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 701 (Talmadge, J., concurring). 
113 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).  As the Court stated: 
 A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on po-
litical communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their 
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the arguments supporting this conclusion need not be repeated 
here.114  Whether corporate expenditures, however, are entitled to 
similar protection is an open question.115  This is so because the Court 
 
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.  This is because virtually 
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the ex-
penditure of money.  The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet en-
tails printing, paper, and circulation costs.  Speeches and rallies generally ne-
cessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event.  The electorate’s increasing 
dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and informa-
tion has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable in-
struments of effective political speech. 
Id.  (footnote omitted). 
114 For what it’s worth, I agree with Buckley’s conclusion on this point.  See Mar-
shall, supra note 25, at 352-54 (agreeing with Buckley that “the expenditure of money 
for political speech and the political speech itself are inextricably bound”).  For excel-
lent commentary on the opposite side, see Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity:  Un-
veiling the Property Characteristics of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1236-37 (2000) 
(arguing that political money should be treated as both property and speech); see also 
J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:  Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 
(1976) (concluding that “nothing in the First Amendment” prohibits legislative restric-
tions on the use of money in political campaigns when such restrictions would move 
the process “closer to the kind of community process which lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment—a process wherein ideas and candidates prevail because of their inher-
ent worth” and not their fundraising abilities); William J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can 
You Go?  State Campaign Contribution Limits and the First Amendment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 483, 
510-12 (1996) (discussing the criticisms levied against the money-as-speech proposi-
tion). 
115 The Court has held that not all campaign money is entitled to the same First 
Amendment status.  Campaign contribution restrictions, for example, have been held 
not to trigger the most exacting constitutional scrutiny because such regulations “en-
tail only marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free commu-
nication.”  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21; see also McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 628 
(2003) (citing Buckley); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) (de-
scribing contribution limits as more akin to an abridgement of the right of association 
rather than the right of free speech).  The Court also distinguished between campaign 
expenditures and campaign contributions on grounds that the state interest in regulat-
ing contributions is greater than its interest in regulating expenditures because dona-
tions created a greater risk of actual, or the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-47. 
 Buckley’s expenditure/contribution distinction has been among the most criticized 
aspects of the opinion.  The Court’s conclusion that contributions raise only marginal 
restrictions on the donor’s speech have been criticized on several grounds, including 
(1) that contributions, like expenditures, express political messages, see Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, supra note 78, at 666 (“[B]oth contributions and expenditures may equally 
express political opinions.”), (2) that contributions are essentially a form of indirect 
expenditures, id., and (3) that “[a] contribution is a quintessential act of political asso-
ciation, just as an expenditure is an act of expression,” Burt Neuborne, The Supreme 
Court and Free Speech:  Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 796 (1998).  The 
Court’s attempt to distinguish between the strength of the state interest in limiting 
contributions vis-a-vis limiting expenditures has also been criticized on grounds that it 
is the demand for campaign expenditures that drives the need for campaign contribu-
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has been less than specific in explaining its decisions holding that, al-
though campaign expenditures in general cannot be constitutionally 
limited, corporate expenditures can.116  One answer might be that 
corporate expenditures may be especially limited because they impli-
cate a more compelling state interest than exists with respect to other 
political expenditures.  If so, the comparison between corporate ex-
penditures and deceptive campaign speech rests with the analysis of 
the relative strength of the state’s interests discussed below.117  Alterna-
tively, however, the Court might be suggesting that corporate speech 
is not entitled to full protection because it is of inherently lesser value.  
Support for this interpretation comes from the Court’s account of 
corporate speech as being distortionary because the “‘immense aggre-
gations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form . . . have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corpora-
tion’s political ideas.’”118  While this passage may not be a model of clar-
ity, it can be read to mean that, in the Court’s view, corporate expen-
ditures raise less First Amendment concern because their power to 
persuade in the political marketplace is unrelated to their intellectual 
content and serves only to skew public debate away from a fair and in-
formed assessment among competing ideals.119  Accordingly, the ex-
penditures, to use a familiar phrase, have only “slight social value as a 
step to truth”120 and, as such, are only low-value speech and not enti-
tled to full First Amendment protection.121 
 
tions.  See Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055-56 (1999) (criticizing the outcome of Buckley that has left the 
demand side of campaign finance unregulated even in the face of “the hydraulic pres-
sures to raise and spend money on contested political campaigns”). 
116 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 644-48.  Noncorporate campaign expenditures, how-
ever, can be subject to disclosure laws.  Coordinated campaign expenditures may also 
be regulated as campaign contributions.  See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 464-65 (2001) (upholding the constitutionality of expenditures 
by a political party that are independent from the party’s efforts on behalf of a particu-
lar candidate, but still allowing restrictions of coordinated expenditures). 
117 See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing the state’s interest in regulating cor-
porate expenditures with its interest in regulating deceptive campaign speech). 
118 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695-96 (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)) (emphasis added). 
119 Richard Hasen terms this the “barometer equality” argument.  Richard L. Ha-
sen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley:  The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 41-42 (2004). 
120 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also discussion su-
pra Part III.A.1 (describing how, why, and in what context false speech is not protected 
by the First Amendment). 
121 In fact, concluding that corporate expenditures, like false statements of fact, 
should be deemed to have “no constitutional value” is problematic.  To begin with, 
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speech doctrine normally does not turn on whether there is a correlation between the 
speaker’s message and the speaker itself.  The Court did not inquire in Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, for example, whether Paul Cohen believed in the statement on the back of his 
jacket, or even whether it was his jacket.  403 U.S. 15 (1971).  Rather, the focus in 
evaluating First Amendment worth is generally upon the value of the speech itself, 
regardless of the identity of the speaker.  See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source, whether corpo-
ration, association, union, or individual.”). 
 The Court has offered two arguments related to corporate structure that purport-
edly support treating corporate expenditures as having low First Amendment value.  
First, the Court has treated corporate expenditures as, in effect, akin to state-
subsidized speech on grounds that corporate wealth is only accumulated through the 
special legal benefits accorded corporations by state law.  See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 
U.S. 146, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2206 (2003) (describing how “[s]tate law grants corporations 
special advantages” including “limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment 
of the accumulation and distribution of assets” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Because of this special treatment, the Court concluded, allowing corporations to use 
their wealth to influence political decision making would provide them with “an unfair 
advantage in the political marketplace.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Sec-
ond, the Court maintained that corporate expenditure limitations could be justified 
on grounds that they protect shareholders from having their “money used to support 
political candidates to whom they might be opposed.”  Id.(internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Banning expenditures from corporate treasuries thus prevents corporations 
from engaging in speech not reflective of the positions of its shareholders. 
 Whether such considerations should lead to the conclusion that corporate expen-
ditures should be viewed as having low-level value under the First Amendment is de-
batable.  It is notable that the Court has rejected, for example, the general contention 
that entities receiving government subsidies may be precluded from engaging in First 
Amendment activity.  See FEC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (hold-
ing unconstitutional the requirement that public broadcasting stations that receive 
grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting are prohibited from editorializ-
ing).  However, even accepting the legitimacy of the subsidized speech and share-
holder protection rationales, these arguments do not support McConnell’s upholding 
of labor expenditures limitations.  The state subsidy argument does not apply to un-
ions because, as the Court itself recognized in Austin, unions raise money “without the 
significant state-conferred advantages of the corporate structure.”  Austin, 494 U.S. at 
665.  Similarly, the argument that expenditure bans protect dissenting organization 
members also does not apply to unions because, as Austin again recognized, union 
members, unlike shareholders, can decline to contribute to support the political activi-
ties of their organization.  Id. at 665-66; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 
209, 235-36 (1977) (holding that union employees have a First Amendment right to, 
but cannot be compelled to, contribute to the political activities of other union mem-
bers with whom they disagree).  Accordingly, “the funds available for a union’s politi-
cal activities more accurately reflect[] members’ support for the organization’s politi-
cal views than does a corporation’s general treasury.”  Austin, 494 U.S. at 666. 
 The argument that the combined category of corporate and labor expenditures is 
of greater First Amendment value than false campaign speech is therefore relatively 
straightforward.  McConnell, in sustaining such regulations, thus opens the door to 
other types of campaign regulations that restrict non-low-level speech, including pre-
sumably other types of campaign expenditures.  Cf. Hasen, supra note 119, at 71 (argu-
ing that McConnell could affect expenditures by “a wide group of nongovernmental ac-
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But even if both corporate expenditures and false campaign 
speech are construed to have only low value in the search for truth, 
they could nonetheless be distinguished from each other.  False cam-
paign speech may need more expansive protection than corporate 
expenditures for reasons unrelated to the inherent value of falsity.  
These are the reasons already mentioned, such as the need for breath-
ing space for election speech, the First Amendment principle that in 
matters of politics, the people and not the government should be the 
arbiters of truth, and the risk that enforcement of campaign speech 
regulations would be vulnerable to partisan misuse.122 
Similar arguments, however, could be advanced with respect to 
the regulation of corporate expenditures.  To the extent campaign fi-
nance limits have provisions that may be subject to differing interpre-
tations, partisan abuse is again possible.123  Moreover, campaign fi-
nance restrictions raise a problem with political self-dealing that 
campaign speech restrictions do not.  While deceptive campaign 
speech regulations are neutral between incumbent and challenger, 
campaign finance regulations generally are not.124  As Ronald Cass ar-
gues, campaign finance issues are matters of “immediate personal 
concern” to legislators, and it would be unexpected if their regulation 
 
tors”).  The problem in drawing this conclusion from McConnell, however, is that the 
Court did not grapple with the potential significance of its labor expenditure holding 
and instead treated labor and corporate expenditures as constitutionally equivalent 
without discussion.  The Court’s decision may thus have been as much about not dis-
rupting the delicate political balance achieved by Congress in enacting BCRA as it was 
an effort to wholly reformulate the First Amendment law regarding campaign expendi-
ture limitations. 
122 See supra notes 66, 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing the argument 
that false campaign speech sanctions are vulnerable to partisan abuse). 
123 Certainly the attempt in BCRA to impose bright-line limits on the situations in 
which corporate speech can be proscribed is helpful step in avoiding this problem.  At 
the same time, however, even BCRA has some provisions, such as the limit on coordi-
nated expenditures, that are sufficiently unclear as to raise the potential for partisan 
abuse.  For example, Republicans have already asked the FEC to investigate whether 
the expenditures of some organizations have been improperly coordinated with the 
Kerry campaign.  See, e.g., Lisa Getter, Kerry Aided by “Illegal” Soft Money, GOP Claims, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A22 (detailing Republican claims of the Kerry campaign’s al-
leged coordination with 527 groups); Andrea Stone & Jim Drinkard, F.E.C. Filing Tar-
gets Liberal Groups, USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2004, at 4A (reporting on the Republican Na-
tional Committee’s attempts to block fundraising for MoveOn.org and other groups by 
claiming illegal coordination with the Kerry campaign). 
124 As Michael Klarman notes, “[t]he one thing that virtually all commentators 
agree upon . . . is that legislators drafting campaign finance legislation will seek to en-
hance the advantages of incumbency.”  Klarman, supra note 75, at 537. 
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were enacted without advantaging incumbency.125  Again, as with cam-
paign speech regulation, the possibility of political abuse merits close 
First Amendment scrutiny.126 
3.  Summary 
At first glance, corporate campaign expenditures would seem to 
present greater First Amendment issues than deceptive campaign 
speech.  After all, while the Court has held that there is no First 
Amendment value in false statements of fact, it has stated that cam-
paign money implicates substantial First Amendment concern.  Upon 
closer review, however, the question is more complex.  First, corporate 
expenditures can also be seen as having little First Amendment value 
if they are, as the Court suggests, distortive and thus of little worth in 
the search for truth.  Second, the First Amendment claim for false 
campaign speech can be based on concerns unrelated to the value of 
falsity, namely that regulating such speech would chill the give-and-
take inherent in election battles and open the door to partisan abuse.  
Seen in this light, the claim for First Amendment protection for false 
campaign speech may be stronger than for corporate campaign ex-
penditures.  But the comparison is still not complete because the 
regulation of corporate campaign expenditures also raises concerns of 
political misdealing, as campaign finance regulation is inherently sus-
ceptible to the problems of legislative entrenchment.  As such, its 
regulation also calls for careful scrutiny.  In the end, then, the First 
Amendment case for protecting deceptive speech and the one for 
protecting corporate expenditures are not easily distinguished.127  The 
claim that there is a clear difference in the constitutional equation 
 
125 Ronald A. Cass, Money, Power, and Politics:  Governance Models and Campaign Fi-
nance Regulation, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 56-58 (1998). 
126 McConnell has been thoroughly criticized for overly deferring to legislative 
judgment despite the likelihood that campaign finance regulation will generally serve 
incumbency advantage.  See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 720 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (highlighting the regulations’ unfair effects on challengers versus incumbents); 
id. at 742 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the McConnell majority’s deference to 
Congress despite the incumbency protection problem); see also Bauer, supra note 75, at 
19 n.84 (arguing the incumbency protection issue was not properly addressed by the 
majority in McConnell); Hasen, supra note 119, at 60-62 (discussing the incumbency 
protection issue). 
127 As noted above, the wildcard in this is the Court’s suggestion that labor expen-
ditures are of the same First Amendment value as corporate expenditures.  If this is 
indeed the Court’s position, then expenditures clearly hold more First Amendment 
value than false campaign speech.  See supra note 121 (assessing the case for treating 
labor expenditures like corporate expenditures). 
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governing the two issues must come from the other side of the consti-
tutional inquiry, i.e., that there is a difference in the relative strengths 
of the state’s interests supporting regulation.  We now turn to this is-
sue. 
B.  Lies or Money:  Which Raises the Greater Concern? 
The issue of whether the state’s interests in regulating campaign 
finance are greater than its interests in regulating campaign speech 
poses the considerable question of what causes greater harm to the 
electoral process, lies or money?  McConnell is helpful in setting the 
framework for answering this question because it has identified the 
relevant state interests to be compared—the interests in preventing 
distortion and in limiting voter alienation.128  We address each interest 
in turn. 
1.  Campaign Distortion 
As we have seen, the state interest in preventing campaign distor-
tion is common to both campaign speech and campaign finance regu-
lation.  The antidistortion interest, however, applies differently in the 
two areas.  With respect to proscribing deceptive speech, the state’s 
interest is the relatively straightforward purpose of preserving in-
formed and accurate electoral choices, because allowing misleading 
information to enter the political marketplace can lead the electorate 
to make uninformed or misinformed choices.129 
The state interest in curbing the distorting effects of money on 
the electoral process, on the other hand, is less direct.  While money 
can have a direct effect on voter choice if only one side has the re-
sources to disseminate its message, the distortion recognized in the 
corporate expenditure cases is not based on the concern with the in-
ability of some to communicate.  The concern, rather, is that “im-
mense aggregations of wealth” will allow some entities to overcommu-
nicate.  But assuming that the disseminated messages are not 
misleading, why is over-communication a problem?  As Justice Thomas 
writes in his McConnell dissent: 
 
 
128 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696-97. 
129 Cf. Carlton F.W. Larson, Case Note, Bearing False Witness, 108 YALE L.J. 1155, 
1157 (1999) (noting that proper legislative action is premised on accurate informa-
tion). 
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The only effect, however, that the “immense aggregations” of wealth will 
have . . . on an election is that they might be used to fund communica-
tions to convince voters to select certain candidates over others.  In other 
words, the “corrosive and distorting effects” . . . are that corporations, on 
behalf of their shareholders, will be able to convince voters of the cor-
rectness of their ideas.
130
 
Of course, the actual reason underlying the fear that wealth will 
distort campaign results is that political ads do not “convince” the 
electorate of the “correctness” of their positions as those terms are 
used by Justice Thomas.  If they did, the quantity of political ads would 
not make a difference—so long as the candidates had resources to 
provide a sufficient threshold of information to the voters.  Rather, 
the answer to Justice Thomas is that rational, fact-based decision mak-
ing does not explain voter decision making.  As Daniel Ortiz explains 
in his important work, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Re-
form,131 the premise of campaign finance regulation is that, although 
there may be a class of politically aware or well informed voters who 
are moved by rational persuasion, there remains a more fluid group of 
uninformed and relatively disinterested voters who respond better to 
emotional stimuli than to reasoned appeals.132  Accordingly, wealth 
matters, because it has the ability to affect voter choice through its ad-
vertisement purchasing power unrelated to its ability to intellectually 
convince voters of the correctness of particular positions.133 
Note, at this point, the differing assumptions between the antidis-
tortion rationale in the campaign finance setting and in the campaign 
speech context.  For campaign speech, the assumption underlying the 
regulatory interest is that voters are politically informed individuals 
who are persuaded by reasoned arguments based on fair assessments 
of the facts.134  For this reason, campaign speech that distorts the facts 
is problematic.  The assumption in campaign finance regulation, on 
the other hand, is that voters are relatively uninformed and are per-
 
130 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 735 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Austin v. Mich. 
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). 
131 Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 893 (1998).  Ortiz terms this premise undemocratic because the notion that vot-
ers will be moved by emotion rather than by reasoning through political arguments is 
inconsistent with “one of democracy’s central normative assumptions:  the idea that 
voters are civically competent.”  Id. at 895. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the reasons for regulating deceptive 
campaign speech). 
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suaded more by emotion than by reason.  Thus, the financial power 
that enables one side to dominate the avenues of mass communica-
tion is the regulatory target.  Asking which regulatory interest is 
stronger thus becomes, in effect, the question of which group, in-
formed or uninformed voters, is more needful of government inter-
vention on its behalf.  Is there a greater interest in protecting the abil-
ity of the informed voter to make reasoned decisions or is it more 
important to protect the less informed from the manipulative force of 
extensive advertising campaigns? 
Actually, the dichotomy is probably less stark.  The voting deci-
sions of most of the electorate are probably best described as “low-
level reasoning”—a process that involves both rational and nonra-
tional, informed and uninformed behavior.135  Thus, even if it is accu-
rate to distinguish between relatively informed and relatively uni-
formed voters, the state interests in preventing both wealth and 
message campaign distortions cut across the entire electorate. 
It may be argued, nevertheless, that there is a greater interest in 
limiting the power of wealth to distort campaigns on grounds that it 
may be easier to protect oneself from misleading information than 
from emotional manipulation, because the former engages the ra-
tional processes while the latter works more subconsciously.136  The 
answer to this point, however, is that there is also emotional power in 
deception.  In fact, the power of deception to affect voting choices 
may be greatest with respect to those who are least informed.  Con-
sider, once again, the ad in Boyce & Isley.137  Although Cooper’s ad may 
have been sufficiently dramatic to sustain the attention of relatively 
disinterested voters, it is far less likely that a response by Boyce would 
be equally attention-grabbing.  His claim that he had not charged the 
state $28,000 per hour, but had only sought that amount in fees, may 
be too subtle to attract the disinterested voters’ attentions.  If the 
 
135 See generally SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER:  COMMUNICATION AND 
PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 7, 16 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that voters act 
more on “cues” from the political culture than on a detailed understanding of political 
issues). 
136 Any argument that there is a greater interest in protecting voters from factual 
distortion than from emotional manipulation, on the other hand, would have to be 
based on the grounds that it is more consistent with the democratic premise that vot-
ing behavior is fact based and rational.  As Ortiz points out, however, such an argu-
ment misunderstands why campaign regulation is needed in the first place.  Ortiz, su-
pra note 131, at 895. 
137 Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); see also 
supra text accompanying note 10 (quoting the ad). 
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truth, as they say, has difficulty catching up with a lie,138 its ability to do 
well will be enormously more difficult when the lie is dramatic and the 
truth only nuanced. 
2.  Voter Alienation 
The question of whether false statements contribute to voter al-
ienation as much as or more than the insertion of large sums of 
money into campaigns is also difficult.  Those arguing that money in-
flicts the greater injury might rely on the point presented above, that 
concerns with truth are overstated because American voters have tra-
ditionally accepted deceptive campaign statements as an ingrained 
part of the nation’s political life.139  Indeed, rather than operating as a 
source of voter turnoff, the voters’ awareness of deceptive campaign-
ing serves as a source of entertainment and provides voters with a 
healthy skepticism of politicians that serves, rather than undercuts, 
democracy.  The same, however, can be said about public awareness 
of the influence of money in the political process.  That money has 
always had enormous political power is no secret.  After all, as early as 
1895, the industrialist and political powerbroker Marcus Hanna fa-
mously stated:  “There are two things that are important in politics.  
The first is money and I can’t remember what the second one is.”140 
More importantly, the everyone-knows-politicians-lie argument does 
not fully address the voter alienation question.  Although voters at one 
level accept the reality of deceptive campaign messages, this does not 
mean that they are not turned off by that realization.  The belief that 
all politicians lie hardly invites political participation any more (or 
less) than the belief that money controls politics. 
It might also be contended that the infusion of wealth fosters 
greater voter alienation than deceptive campaign speech because the 
latter works directly on the voter while the former operates behind the 
voters’ backs.  In the case of a deceptive campaign ad, the voter has 
the power to either believe or disbelieve the ad—the power of the 
candidate’s deception, in short, is a function of the voter herself.  In 
the case of campaign finance, on the other hand, the voter is power-
 
138 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974), quoted in Cent. Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 593 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
139 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (noting that American voters are 
traditionally skeptical toward the statements of political candidates). 
140 See Cynthia Crosson, The Man Who Made Political Campaigns All About Money, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004, at B1 (quoting Hanna). 
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less.  She has no role in limiting the influence that the large campaign 
donation has on the candidate, and she may then arguably become 
more alienated from a system over which she has no control. 
There are two weaknesses to this position.  One is descriptive:  is it 
truly less of a turnoff to the process to be deliberately lied to than it is 
to have decisions made behind one’s back?  Secondly, and more im-
portantly, while there may be merit in the contention that believing 
political events are outside of one’s control is more alienating, this ra-
tionale applies more to the regulation of campaign contributions than 
to corporate expenditures.  The troublesome aspect of corporate ex-
penditures, according to the Court, lies less in their ability to curry fa-
vor141 than in their ability to sway voters through expensive media 
campaigns.  The voter thus has the same option when faced with an 
ad paid for by corporate wealth that she has when faced with a decep-
tive campaign ad.  She can either accept or reject the message.142 
Perhaps the best argument that campaign finance raises greater 
regulatory concern with respect to voter alienation is that the harms 
caused by the infusion of wealth into the system may be broader than 
those caused by campaign deception.  False campaign speech affects, 
and is designed to affect, the results of elections.  The citizen who be-
lieves that all candidates lie might on that basis be deterred from par-
ticipating in a political election.  The infusion of money into a politi-
cal campaign, on the other hand, is designed to affect the results of 
elections and the subsequent actions of elected officials.  Money thus 
taints the entire political process and not just political campaigns.  
The citizen who believes that the political process belongs primarily to 
the highest bidders might be disaffected from the political process al-
together----including believing that without money, political change is 
not possible. 
Deceptive speech, however, may also cause estrangement from the 
entire political process.  After all, believing that all candidates lie to 
get elected is hardly a recipe for believing in candidates once they 
 
141 To be sure, in McConnell v. FEC, the United States offered this reason in its de-
fense of corporate expenditure limitations.  124 S. Ct. 619, 748 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the government’s brief for the 
proposition that “[f]avoritism and influence are not, as the Government’s theory sug-
gests, avoidable in representative politics”).  The Court majority, however, did not rely 
on this rationale in upholding the corporate speech expenditure limitation. 
142 In fact, she may be better equipped to resist the ad paid for by corporations or 
unions because, while disclosure laws will empower her to ascertain where the money 
is coming from, she will not have similar means to uncover an ad based on deception. 
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have been elected.143  Moreover, as Robert Bellah notes, disparaging 
attacks on political leaders undercut a society’s respect for its political 
institutions and its own sense of communal identity.144  It is not clear, 
in short, that money is any greater source of voter alienation than is 
the barrage of negative, deceptive candidate attack ads that dominate 
contemporary political campaigns. 
3.  Summary 
As with the previous discussion of the relative strength of the 
competing First Amendment interests, analysis of the state interests in 
combating voter alienation and campaign distortion does not clearly 
establish a significant difference in the constitutional equation re-
specting deceptive campaign speech regulation and corporate expen-
diture regulation.  Although the campaign distortion addressed by 
each type of regulation is different, there is no clear argument that 
eliminating the distortion resulting from campaign lies is any more, or 
less, compelling than eliminating the distortion caused by the infusion 
of immense aggregations of wealth into political campaigns.  Similarly, 
the state’s interests in combating voter alienation seem largely equiva-
lent.  Neither the belief that wealth controls politics nor the belief that 
politicians lie to get elected instills much faith in the political system.  
If there is to be a distinction drawn between the state’s interests in 
limiting corporate expenditures and its interests in proscribing decep-
tive campaign speech, it may have to be articulated on grounds other 
than preventing campaign distortion and combating voter alien-
ation.145 
 
143 On the other hand, it is not clear that the voter disillusionment derived from 
believing one has been misled in the course of a political campaign has much staying 
power after the election.  Whether this is because voters assume that once elected, 
politicians will be bettered by respect for the institution they represent, or whether 
voters are simply vested in affirming their own political choices, the fact is that politi-
cians’ approval ratings generally go up after being elected, no matter how unseemly 
the political campaign.  Cf. Richard Benedetto, Clinton’s Job Rating Hits All-Time High, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 1997, at 10A (noting that President Clinton began his second 
term in office with a 62% approval rating). 
144 See Bellah, supra note 51, at 745 (noting that the reputations of community 
leaders shape the identity of the community). 
145 One such argument is readily available.  The contention could be made that 
there is a greater regulatory interest in regulating campaign finance because of the 
strength of a government’s interest in promoting political equality. After all, lying has 
no financial threshold and the ability to lie does not categorically exclude persons a 
priori from competing in the political process.  A system in which wealth has excessive 
influence, on the other hand, penalizes those without substantial resources ab initio.  
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C.  Implications 
If the preceding analysis is accurate, there is little basis to distin-
guish the constitutional equation governing the regulation of false 
campaign speech from the equation governing the regulation of cor-
porate expenditures.  Because McConnell upheld the regulation of 
corporate expenditures, it would follow directly that the regulation of 
deceptive campaign speech should be upheld as well.  As applied to 
Boyce & Isley, then, this would suggest that there is no reason to dis-
turb the appellate court’s decision on constitutional grounds.146  If 
Cooper’s statement satisfied requirements for liability generally, it 
should not matter that the false statement was disseminated in the 
course of a political campaign—a conclusion that should send chills 
through the hearts of political candidates and consultants everywhere. 
But the implication of McConnell for campaign speech issues may 
be even more significant.  If corporate expenditures are deemed not 
to be low-level speech,147 then the conclusion that the state’s antidis-
tortion and antialienation interests are sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify corporate expenditure prohibitions is even more far-reaching.148  
For example, to use examples from the case law, to the extent that the 
state’s interest in prohibiting election-day endorsements for candi-
dates is premised on eliminating campaign distortion,149 or to the ex-
 
This rationale, however, does not explain McConnell because the case did not overturn 
precedent suggesting that political equality was unavailable as a justification for cam-
paign finance restrictions.  In Buckley, for example, the Court rejected, in no uncertain 
terms, the political equality rationale as providing the basis for campaign finance regu-
lation.  To the Buckley Court, “the concept that government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”  424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). 
146 Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).  However, 
there are other potential grounds for reversal.  The case could be overturned if a 
higher court were to disagree with the appellate court’s assessment that Cooper’s 
statement was false.  The defamation claim might also be reversed on common law 
defamation grounds, such as finding that Cooper’s statement that Boyce “charged” 
instead of “sought” legal fees, id. at 899, was not defamatory. 
147 As noted earlier, the McConnell Court’s treatment of labor and corporate ex-
penditures as constitutional equivalents clearly suggests this result.  See supra note 121 
(observing that McConnell treated labor and corporate expenditures in the same man-
ner without discussion). 
148 It might also be suggested that the state interest in combating deceptive cam-
paign speech could be construed under campaign finance precedent to be more ex-
pansive in other ways.  After all, if the state interest in anticorruption includes the pre-
vention of corruption and the appearance of corruption, why can’t the state interest in 
antideception include the prevention of deception and the appearance of deception? 
149 See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (holding unconstitutional an Ala-
bama law prohibiting the publication of editorials on election day that urged citizens 
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tent that the state’s interest in regulating the content of candidate 
speech in judicial elections is based upon the antialienation concern 
of promoting citizen confidence in judicial institutions,150 such meas-
ures might also be upheld under a post-McConnell jurisprudence.  The 
latent tension between McConnell and cases such as Mills v. Alabama151 
or Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,152 in short, should be obvious. 
It may be the case that McConnell did not intend to go this far and 
was intended to apply only to the campaign finance area.  But the 
opinion itself suggests otherwise.  Although the Court was careful in 
McConnell to assure that its analysis would not apply to noncampaign 
expression, it did not distinguish among different types of campaign 
expression (speech and finance) and instead grouped them together.  
Thus, referring to a campaign finance restriction, the Court stated, 
“[w]e assume that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign 
speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads.”153  
Moreover, it is not clear how the Court could categorically distinguish 
between campaign speech and campaign finance even if it wanted to 
do so, since it has found that the appropriate factors to be weighed for 
each issue are exactly the same.  One might be able to distinguish be-
tween noncampaign political speech and campaign political speech, 
as the Court does, on grounds that different state interests are at play 
in each context.  But a similar distinction cannot be made when work-
ing from the premise that the same interests are at stake.  The only 
point of distinction is whether the interests work out differently from 
the corporate expenditure to the deceptive speech context-–-the issue 
we have already visited. 
There are, of course, escape options.  The Court could abandon 
its expansive notions of antidistortion and anticorruption and decide 
to uphold corporate expenditure limitations on political equality 
grounds.  Such a move, in one sense, would be groundbreaking in set-
ting the stage for further campaign finance reform.154  In another 
 
to vote in a certain way, despite the Alabama Supreme Court’s claim that the law pro-
tected against voter confusion). 
150 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding unconsti-
tutional a canon of judicial conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing 
their views on legal or political issues, despite the claim that the canon preserved the 
appearance of impartiality). 
151 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
152 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
153 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696 n.88 (emphasis added). 
154 See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class:  Campaign Finance, Participation, and De-
mocracy, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 81-85 (2004) (arguing that McConnell provides a founda-
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sense, however, it would be fairly modest.  Commentators since Austin 
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, for example, have already effec-
tively argued that the state’s interest in combating the “corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” recognized in 
that case is actually an equality interest.155 
Alternatively, the Court could retreat from its Buckley holding that 
campaign money is exactly the same as core political speech.  This 
also might be considered revolutionary given that so much jurispru-
dence and legislation has proceeded from the “money equals speech” 
assumption.  On the other hand, this step also might be considered 
relatively modest, given that the Court’s campaign contribution deci-
sions already suggest that, in application, the Court has not found dol-
lars and words to be completely fungible.156  For now, however, the 
opinion has as much to say about campaign speech as about campaign 
finance. 
CONCLUSION 
Money alone does not win elections.  Although it may be true, as 
the Court stated in Buckley, that the power of political messages to per-
suade voters is dependent upon the funds through which that mes-
sage is disseminated, it is also true that the persuasive power of money 
is dependent upon the message it carries.  Money is also not alone in 
its ability to inflict injury upon the political process.  Unregulated 
campaign speech can generate more than its share of harm.  Like po-
litical money, deceptive campaign speech can distort debate in the po-
litical marketplace.  Like political money, deceptive campaign speech 
can alienate the electorate and discourage political participation. 
In McConnell v. FEC, the Court made clear that the state’s interests 
in preventing campaign distortion and voter alienation were suffi-
ciently weighty to justify limiting campaign expenditures by corpora-
tions and labor unions.  As a matter of campaign finance law, the mer-
its of this decision can be debated, but it is clear that McConnell will 
also have significant ramifications for election issues other than cam-
paign finance because of the way it was decided.  By tying its holding 
 
tion for upholding campaign finance regulation on political equality grounds). 
155 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 86, at 109-10 (arguing that the antidistortion interest 
is actually an equality concern). 
156 See Sullivan, supra note 78, at 666 (criticizing the Court for treating campaign 
expenditures as core speech interests, while arguing that campaign contributions do 
not implicate expressive interests). 
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to the antidistortion and antialienation interests, the Court has also 
set the stage for upholding significant restrictions on campaign 
speech.  In particular, the logic of McConnell would suggest, at the 
least, that the First Amendment does not require special solicitude for 
false campaign speech despite the argument that speech in this area 
should be most protected.  This would mean that deceptive campaign 
speech could be prohibited, but only when the statements are uttered 
with actual malice-–-a qualification that, although highly protective in 
most areas, may arguably be insufficiently protective when applied to 
campaign speech.157  Even more problematic for free speech purposes, 
McConnell may go even further to suggest that campaign speech may 
be subject to even greater restrictions than that applied in other areas 
because, according to the Court, the antidistortion and antialienation 
interests are so powerful in the political campaign setting. 
Certainly, sanctioning deceptive campaign messages is supported 
by sound policy considerations.  But the First Amendment concerns 
triggered by such regulation are also compelling.  After all, campaign 
speech by its very nature is tumultuous, provocative, and prone to 
overstatement; and investing the government with the power to pro-
scribe campaign speech, in any form, raises the most serious First 
Amendment concerns.  Thus, while it may be true that McConnell 
sheds significant light on the validity of deceptive campaign speech 
restrictions, it is also true that weighing the competing interests un-
derlying campaign speech restrictions sheds significant light on the 
validity of McConnell. 
 
157 Indeed, if the subject of the false statement is a private person and the state-
ment is defamatory, it can be sanctioned upon a finding of only negligence.  See Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that states may define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability in defamation suits brought by private 
individuals against the media, “so long as they do not impose liability without fault”).  
This may be significant even in campaigns because, even though a candidate’s political 
opponent will be construed to be a public figure necessitating application of the actual 
malice standard, it is possible that a candidate’s statements could be construed to be 
defamatory towards third parties.  In fact, some of the plaintiffs in Boyce & Isley were 
merely members of candidate Boyce’s firm and, as such, contended that they were pri-
vate figures who did not have to show actual malice.  568 S.E.2d 893, 900-01 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
